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FOR AGE IN THE MIRANDA ANALYSIS 
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          One of the most polarizing areas of constitutional 
criminal procedure is that relating to police interrogations 
and confessions. While the Fifth Amendment guarantees a 
number of protections from self-incrimination and the 
inherently coercive nature of criminal investigation, these 
Constitutional promises are more likely to go unfulfilled 
when the accused is a child. This Article thoroughly 
examines the current law’s use of the “totality of the 
circumstances” test in deciding whether a valid Miranda 
waiver occurred or whether a juvenile has been taken into 
custody and, more importantly, explores why this current test 
remains an inadequate solution for protecting children’s 
Miranda rights. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
“All right. So, you have the right to remain silent. You know what 
that means?” Detective Hopewell asked.1 “Yes, it means that I have 
the right to stay calm,” replied 10-year-old Joseph.2  
The recent case In re Joseph H.3 has prompted much debate in the 
legal community over the question of how child suspects should be 
treated during a criminal investigation, particularly with regards to the 
protection of a child’s Miranda rights during a custodial interrogation. 
As the law stands today, the exchange above between young Joseph 
and Detective Hopewell is sufficient to constitute a waiver of Joseph’s 
Miranda rights—a decision carrying significant legal consequence.4 
Meanwhile, however, modern developmental and neurological studies 
of juvenile development show, more clearly than ever, that juveniles 
actually lack the experience, maturity, and judgment necessary to 
make such legal decisions independently.5 The resulting outcome is 
that the present law does not adequately protect children from having 
their legal rights violated. 
While significant juvenile criminal law reforms have begun to 
take shape in California, the current solutions offered have yet to fully 
ensure that children’s Miranda rights are protected. In response to 
Joseph H., for example, the California legislature attempted to 
implement Senate Bill 1052 (“SB 1052”)—legislation that would have 
required minors under 18 years of age to consult with legal counsel 
prior to a custodial interrogation or Miranda waiver.6 While this 
measure would have provided significant protection for all children, 
the bill became caught in the political web.7 Instead, a new version of 
the bill, Senate Bill 395 (“SB 395”), was passed and signed into law 
on October 14, 2017.8 This 2.0 version protects only those children 
aged 15 and under.9 Thus, despite a continuing need for improvement 
 
 1. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting). 
 2. Id.  
        3.   367 P.3d 1 (Cal. 2015). 
 4. In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 185 (Ct. App. 2015). 
 5. See infra pp. 125–127. 
 6. S.B. 1052, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 7. SB-1052 Custodial Interrogation: juveniles., CAL. LEGIS. INFO. (last visited Apr. 7, 2019), 
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billHistoryClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052.  
Governor Brown vetoed the first version of the bill, Senate Bill 1052 (“SB 1052”), after citing 
concerns that the bill could obstruct police investigations. Id.  
 8. S.B. 395, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
 9. Id. 
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in this area of California law, an all-encompassing solution has not yet 
arrived. 
Although those in search of a solution should continue fighting 
for all children through the California legislature, they should also 
consider doubling their efforts by urging the California courts to 
revisit their application of the law on this issue. Current law requires 
the courts to consider the “totality of the circumstances” in deciding 
whether a valid Miranda waiver occurred or whether a juvenile has 
been taken into custody.10 However, as this Article argues, the courts’ 
application of the totality of the circumstances test (“totality test”) is 
incomplete at best (and plainly subjective at worst) because it does not 
adequately ensure that the characteristics of childhood are accounted 
for in analyzing whether a child’s Miranda rights have been violated. 
In particular, this Article argues that the analysis is presently failing to 
account for children as a unique and vulnerable class of citizen and 
argues for modifying the test to ensure the appropriate weight is given 
to a child-suspect’s age. 
Part II of this Article details the current law regarding criminal 
procedure and the Fifth Amendment, and provides a timeline of this 
law’s evolution as it pertains to children. Part III provides a critique of 
the Court’s current application of the totality test in cases involving 
children’s Miranda rights. Part III then closes with an explanation for 
why a child’s age should be given substantial weight under the totality 
test by providing modern findings surrounding juvenile development. 
Part IV explores the strengths and weaknesses of other potential 
solutions in applying Miranda to children, and ultimately concludes 
that, regardless of additional legislative protections, the totality test 
should consider whether a waiver or confession was a “product of 
childhood.” Part IV also argues that, by including a direct “product of 
childhood” inquiry under the umbrella of the totality test, courts can 
ensure that the Miranda analysis adequately accounts for the special 
characteristics of children. Part V reflects on the viability of the 
possible solutions discussed and concludes on the current status of 
children in the evolving field of criminal law. 
 
 10. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 724–25 (1979); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 
271–72 (2011). 
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II.  BACKGROUND: MIRANDA AND THE FIFTH AMENDMENT 
One of the most polarizing areas of constitutional criminal 
procedure is that relating to police interrogations and confessions.11 
Longstanding arguments exist over how much merit and weight 
should be assigned to confessions taken during a police 
investigation.12 This is, in part, because the admission of a confession 
in a criminal case can quickly become damning.13 Thus, constitutional 
protections and specialized procedures govern when confessions may 
be properly admitted into evidence. 
A.  Fifth Amendment Rights and Procedures 
The Fifth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution guarantees that 
“No person . . . shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness 
against [her]self. . . .”14 It was this simple line that provided the 
Supreme Court with a foundation for the now-iconic Miranda 
warnings endlessly dramatized on television. Miranda v. Arizona,15 
decided in 1966, held explicitly for the first time that under the Fifth 
Amendment, a person can not be subject to a custodial interrogation 
until she is explicitly informed of her rights.16 The Court held that the 
Constitution protects an accused from being compelled to give 
statements that are testimonial, incriminating, and compelled, and 
guarantees the right to remain silent and the right to counsel.17 In short, 
a typical Miranda warning is usually summarized as: 
 
 11. 2 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., WEST’S CRIMINAL PRACTICE SERIES: CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE § 6.1(A) (4th ed. 2016) (“No area of constitutional criminal procedure has provoked 
more debate over the years than that dealing with police interrogation.”).  
 12. Id. (“In large measure, the debate has centered upon two fundamental questions: (1) how 
important are confessions in the process of solving crimes and convicting the perpetrators? and (2) 
what is the extent and nature of police abuse in seeking to obtain confessions from those suspected 
of crimes?”). 
 13. See Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (“A confession is like no other 
evidence. Indeed, the defendant’s own confession is probably the most probative and damaging 
evidence that can be admitted against him . . . .”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 14. U.S. CONST. amend. V.  
 15. 384 U.S. 436, 442 (1966). 
 16. Id. at 444. The origins of the Miranda rule first appeared in the seminal cases of (1) Brown 
v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278, 285–87 (1936), in which the U.S. Supreme court first struck down a 
conviction because of the manner in which the defendant’s confession was obtained, and (2) 
Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 484 (1964), in which a confession was suppressed because it 
was obtained in violation of the defendant’s right to counsel at the time of interrogation. It also 
affirmed the existence of an absolute right to remain silent. See LAURIE L. LEVENSON, CALIFORNIA 
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 7:3 (2016). 
 17. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 444. 
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You have the right to remain silent. Anything you say can 
and will be used against you in a court of law. You have the 
right to an attorney. If you cannot afford an attorney one will 
be provided for you. Do you understand the rights I have just 
read to you? With these rights in mind, do you wish to speak 
to me?18 
Consequently, Miranda’s articulation of these constitutional 
limitations on custodial police interrogations created new and 
expansive protections for individual rights on which to build.19 
In the years following Miranda, the landscape surrounding Fifth 
Amendment rights was shaped extensively by the Supreme Court. 
Modern Miranda analysis may be broken down into four distinct parts: 
custody, interrogation, delivery, and waiver. While each of these 
stages is integral to a full understanding of a Miranda analysis, the 
most important as far as children are concerned are custody and waiver 
because (1) both utilize some iteration of the totality of the 
circumstances test, and (2) the Supreme Court has considered the 
unique status of children at these stages.20 
1.  Miranda Analysis: Custody 
The first question in determining whether a Miranda warning is 
necessary asks whether the individual who is the target of police 
attention is “in custody.”21 Determining whether an individual is in 
custody is a critical part of the analysis because the purpose of 
Miranda’s due process safeguards is to “protect the individual against 
the coercive nature of custodial interrogation.”22 Miranda warnings 
are only required where the police’s target is in custody; they do not 
apply in noncustodial settings.23 
 
 18. Id. at 467–73; see also What Are Your Miranda Rights?, MIRANDA WARNING, 
http://www.mirandawarning.org/whatareyourmirandarights.html (last visited Apr. 7, 2019). 
 19. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 436. 
 20. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (“This totality-of-the-circumstances 
approach is adequate to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation of 
juveniles is involved.”); J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 280 (2011) (“To be sure, th[e 
totality of the circumstances] test permits consideration of a child’s age, and it erects its own barrier 
to admission of a defendant’s inculpatory statements at trial.”). 
 21. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270. 
 22. Id. (emphasis added). 
 23. Id.; Oregon v. Mathiason, 429 U.S. 492, 495 (1977). 
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Whether a suspect is “in custody” for Miranda purposes is an 
objective determination which consists of two inquiries.24 First, courts 
must consider the “circumstances surrounding the interrogation.”25 
Second, courts must consider whether “a reasonable person [would] 
have felt [that] she was at liberty to terminate the interrogation and 
leave” under those circumstances.26 The custody analysis requires no 
subjective consideration of the suspect’s “actual mindset,”27 but looks 
instead to the totality of the circumstances—an objective inquiry.28 
Employing the totality test to determine whether a suspect was in 
custody is the first stage of the Miranda analysis. 
There is a myriad of case law illustrating the application of the 
totality test to the Miranda custody analysis. In Orozco v. Texas,29 the 
U.S. Supreme Court held that an individual was “in custody” where 
he was awoken by four officers in his bedroom and “under arrest” 
from the moment he gave his name.30 The Orozco Court flatly rejected 
the state’s argument that Miranda should not apply because the 
individual was interrogated on his own bed, in familiar surroundings.31 
Alternatively, in Oregon v. Mathiason,32 the Court found that a 
Miranda warning was not required where an individual confessed, 
went voluntarily to a police station, and was immediately told that he 
was not under arrest and could leave at any time.33 The Court sternly 
emphasized that the custody analysis centers on whether the individual 
is actually in custody, not simply whether the questioning took place 
in a “coercive environment.”34 
 
 24. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270; see also Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 662–63 (2004); 
Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 323 (1994); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) 
(discussing stages of Miranda custody analysis). 
 25. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270. 
 26. Id. (emphasis added). 
 27. Yarborough, 541 U.S. at 667. 
 28. J.D.B., 564 U.S. at 270–71 (citing Stansbury, 511 U.S. at 322) (“Rather than demarcate a 
limited set of relevant circumstances, we have required police officers and courts to examine all of 
the circumstances . . . including any. . . that would have affected how a reasonable person in the 
suspects position would perceive her freedom to leave.”) (internal quotation marks omitted) 
(emphasis added). 
 29. 394 U.S. 324 (1969). 
 30. Id. at 325. 
 31. Id. at 326. 
 32. 429 U.S. 492 (1977). 
 33. Id. at 495. 
 34. Id. 
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Finally, Berkemer v. McCarty35 concerned an intoxicated 
motorist who was pulled over for swerving, given a sobriety test, and 
asked questions about whether he had used intoxicants; the motorist 
answered in the affirmative.36 After the officer determined that the 
motorist was heavily intoxicated, he placed him under arrest and 
transported him to the county jail.37 The Court distinguished the 
statements the motorist made on the roadside from those he made from 
the county jail.38 It held that the roadside statements were admissible 
because the motorist was not yet in custody for the purposes of 
Miranda, but that the jail statements were inadmissible because the 
motorist was in custody when he made them.39 
The totality test as applied to the custody analysis is a fact-
specific but objective inquiry.40 There is no distinct setting required to 
find that an individual is or is not in custody.41 As the above cases 
illustrate, a suspect may be in custody when questioned in an informal 
setting, such as her own bedroom, and may not be in custody when 
questioned in a formal setting, such as a police station. It is easy to see 
the benefits of such flexibility. The Supreme Court itself praised the 
test’s objective component in J.D.B., stating, “The benefit of the 
objective custody analysis is that it is ‘designed to give clear guidance 
to the police.’”42 The Court elaborated: 
By limiting analysis to the objective circumstances of the 
interrogation, and asking how a reasonable person in the 
[individual]’s position would understand [her 
circumstances], the objective test avoids burdening police 
with the task of anticipating the idiosyncrasies of every 
individual suspect and divining how those particular traits 
affect each person’s subjective state of mind.43 
Thus, the Court strongly endorses the objective component of the 
totality test for custody analysis. 
 
 35. 468 U.S. 420 (1984). 
 36. Id. at 423. 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 443. 
 39. Id. at 442. 
 40. J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 272 (2011). 
 41. Id. at 270–71. 
 42. Id. at 271 (citing Yarborough v. Alvarado, 541 U.S. 652, 668 (2004)). 
 43. Id. 
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2.  Miranda Analysis: Interrogation 
The second part of the Miranda analysis asks whether an 
interrogation has occurred.44 While this stage of the Miranda analysis 
does not rely on the totality test discussed above, the interrogation 
analysis is nonetheless critical to the Miranda analysis. An 
individual’s Miranda rights are triggered when she is in custody and 
interrogated, or subjected to the “functional equivalent” of 
interrogation.45 In Rhode Island v. Innis,46 the Court defined the 
“functional equivalent” of interrogation as words or actions that a 
reasonable police officer should know are reasonably likely to elicit 
an incriminating response from the suspect.47 This is essentially an 
objective two-part test that considers both the “reasonable officer” and 
“reasonable suspect” viewpoints.48 
3.  Miranda Analysis: Delivery 
For purposes of Miranda, when an individual is taken into 
custody and interrogated, she is subjected to a “custodial 
interrogation.”49 At this point, any statements taken by the police 
before  giving the individual her Miranda warnings are taken in 
violation of Miranda.50 The Court has emphasized that “the accused 
must be adequately and effectively apprised of [her] rights and the 
exercise of those rights must be fully honored.”51 
4.  Miranda Analysis: Waiver 
The final part of the Miranda analysis looks at whether a valid 
waiver occurred.52 Both the right to remain silent and the right to 
consult with an attorney can be waived.53 
 
 44. See generally Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300 (1980) (“It is clear therefore that 
the special procedural safeguards outlined in Miranda are required not where a suspect is simply 
taken into custody, but rather where a suspect in custody is subjected to interrogation.”). 
 45. Id. at 300–01. 
 46. 446 U.S. 291 (1980). 
 47. Id. at 301–02; see also Pennsylvania v. Muniz, 496 U.S. 582, 600–01 (1990) (explaining 
what constitutes a “functional equivalent” of interrogation). 
 48. See Innis, 446 U.S. at 301–02. 
 49. In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966), the Court defined “custodial 
interrogation” as “questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken 
into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.” 
 50. Id. at 444–45. 
 51. North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 374 (1979). 
 52. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475. 
 53. Id. 
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To be valid, a waiver must be knowingly, intelligently, and 
voluntarily given.54 However, this does not translate into an explicit 
waiver requirement:55 “An express written or oral statement of waiver 
of the right to remain silent or of the right to counsel is usually strong 
proof of the validity of that waiver, but is not inevitably either 
necessary or sufficient to establish waiver.”56 It is at this stage of the 
analysis that the totality test makes its return. Whether an individual 
in a given case waived her rights must be determined by the “particular 
facts and circumstances surrounding that case, including the 
background, experience, and conduct of the accused.”57 This is the 
same “totality” language applied in the Miranda custody analysis.58 
North Carolina v. Butler59 clearly demonstrates how the totality 
test applies to the Miranda waiver analysis. In Butler, an individual 
accused of kidnapping, armed robbery of a gas station, and other 
charges made incriminating statements to police after he was read his 
Miranda rights.60 When asked if the individual understood his rights, 
he responded that he did.61 He later refused to sign a waiver form, but 
continued to speak with the police, stating “I will talk to you but I am 
not signing any form.”62 The Court held that, in looking at the 
surrounding circumstances of the case, the waiver was valid.63 The 
Court emphatically rejected the proposal that the Miranda waiver 
analysis required an explicit statement of waiver, finding that such a 
per se rule would be far too inflexible for the delicate demands of 
Miranda.64 
 
 54. Id. at 444 (“The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the waiver is 
made voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.”). 
 55. Butler, 441 U.S. at 375–76. 
 56. Id. at 373.  
 57. Id. at 374–75. 
 58. See United States v. Washington, 431 U.S. 181, 188 (1977) 
(citing Rogers v. Richmond, 365 U.S. 534, 544 (1961)) (“The test is whether, considering the 
totality of the circumstances, the free will of the witness was overborne.”). 
 59. 441 U.S. 369 (1979). 
 60. Id. at 370.  
 61. Id. at 370–71. 
 62. Id. at 371. 
 63. Id.  
 64. Id. at 376 (“By creating an inflexible rule that no implicit waiver can ever suffice, the 
North Carolina Supreme Court has gone beyond the requirements of federal organic law. It follows 
that its judgment cannot stand, since a state court can neither add to nor subtract from the mandates 
of the United States Constitution.”). 
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A violation of the Miranda rules renders a suspect’s statement 
inadmissible.65 “If [an] interrogation continues without the presence 
of an attorney and a statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the 
government to demonstrate that the defendant knowingly and 
intelligently waived his” Miranda privileges.66 This rule has become 
such a keystone of the American justice system that it applies to all 
federal and state criminal cases, regardless of whether an individual is 
detained on suspicion of a felony or a misdemeanor.67 
5.  The Purpose of Miranda 
The general policy purposes behind Miranda and its 
accompanying legal tests are well-explained in Withrow v. Williams.68 
In Withrow, the Court stated that “a system of criminal law 
enforcement which comes to depend on the ‘confession’ will, in the 
long run, be less reliable and more subject to abuses than a system 
relying on independent investigation.”69 Miranda requirements are not 
intended to hamper the traditional function of police officers in 
investigating crime; rather, they are intended to protect individuals 
from coercive interrogation methods.70 
The Miranda Court elaborated on these concerns extensively.71 It 
observed that “[i]nterrogation . . . takes place in privacy. Privacy 
results in secrecy and this in turn results in a gap in our 
knowledge . . . .”72 The Court cited training manuals used regularly by 
officers: “[T]he principal psychological factor contributing to a 
successful interrogation is privacy–being alone with the person under 
interrogation.”73 The Court also pointed to how these manuals instruct 
 
 65. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 476 (1966). 
 66. Id. at 475 (“If the interrogation continues without the presence of an attorney and a 
statement is taken, a heavy burden rests on the government to demonstrate that the defendant 
knowingly and intelligently waived his privilege against self-incrimination and his right to retained 
or appointed counsel.”). 
 67. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 432 (1984). The Miranda rule was reaffirmed as 
recently as 2000 by the U.S. Supreme Court in an opinion which held that Miranda is a 
constitutional decision which cannot be overturned by congressional statute. Dickerson v. United 
States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). 
 68. 507 U.S. 680 (1993). 
 69. Id. at 693 (citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 448 n. 23 (1974)). 
 70. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 448, 477. 
 71. Id. at 445–56. 
 72. Id. at 448. 
 73. Id. at 449 (citing FRED E. INABU & JOHN REID, CRIMINAL INTERROGATION AND 
CONFESSIONS 1 (1962)). The Court also expressed concern over the tactics advised by these 
manuals, which included “display[ing] an air of confidence in the suspect’s guilt,” “direct[ing] 
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interrogators to dismiss and discourage explanations contrary to guilt 
and sometimes even instruct to “induce a confession out of trickery.”74 
The need for Miranda’s protections were thus obvious to the Court, 
and subsequent cases in the areas of both custody and waiver analysis 
deemed the “totality of the circumstances” test adequate to guarantee 
those protections. 
B.  Fifth Amendment Rights and Procedures for Children 
In the years since Miranda v. Arizona, it has become apparent that 
the Supreme Court’s Miranda jurisprudence has failed to adequately 
protect children. Current California law allows a police officer to take 
children under 18 years old into custody where the officer has 
reasonable cause to believe the minor has committed a crime or 
violated an order of the juvenile court.75 Although federal law still 
requires police to read a child her Miranda rights prior to subjecting 
her to custodial interrogation,76 the application of the protections 
discussed above still generally apply to children in the same manner 
as to adults. This remains the case, despite a clear struggle in the courts 
with this policy.77 As a result, the U.S and California Supreme Courts 
have already tinkered with the application of the totality test as applied 
to children in three specific cases. 
1.  The Totality Test in the Miranda Waiver Analysis:  
Fare v. Michael C. (1979) 
In In re Michael C.,78 the California Supreme Court attempted to 
institute extra protection for children within the Miranda waiver 
analysis. There, sixteen-and-a-half year old Michael C. (“Michael”) 
was taken into police custody on suspicion of murder.79 After being 
 
comments toward the reasons why the subject committed the act, rather than . . . whether he did it,” 
“minimiz[ing] the moral seriousness of the offense,” and “cast[ing] blame on the victim or on 
society.” Id. at 450. 
 74. Id. at 450, 453. 
 75. S.B. 395, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017).  
 76. Id. 
 77. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948). In Haley, the Court recognized that a 
15-year-old child suspected of murder was more deserving of heightened protections from the 
overpowering presence of police during custodial interrogation. The court stated that “[w]hat 
transpired would make us pause . . . if a mature man were involved. And when, as here, a mere 
chil—an easy victim of the law—is before us, special care in scrutinizing the record must be used.” 
Id. 
 78. 579 P.2d 7 (Cal. 1978). 
 79. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 709–10 (1979). 
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read his Miranda rights, Michael asked to see his probation officer.80 
When police denied his request, Michael then agreed to speak with 
them without consulting an attorney.81 Unsurprisingly, Michael then 
proceeded to make statements incriminating himself in the murder.82 
During criminal proceedings, Michael moved to suppress the 
statements, alleging that they were obtained in violation of Miranda.83 
He argued that his request to see his probation officer “constituted an 
invocation of his Fifth Amendment right to remain silent, just as if he 
had requested the assistance of an attorney.”84 Although the California 
Supreme Court accepted this argument, the U.S. Supreme Court 
ultimately rejected it.85 
The California Supreme Court held that Michael’s probation 
officer would act to protect the minor’s Fifth Amendment rights in the 
same way an attorney would act, and thus found Michael’s request for 
his probation officer to be a per se invocation of his Miranda rights.86 
The California Supreme Court did not apply the totality test, finding 
essentially that the circumstances surrounding the interrogation were 
inconsequential to the analysis if Michael had in fact invoked his Fifth 
Amendment privilege by asking for his probation officer.87 
The U.S. Supreme Court, however, disapproved of California’s 
per se rule, and focused instead on the distinctions between probation 
officers and attorneys.88 Specifically, the Court took issue with what 
it saw as the California Supreme Court’s assertion that to a child, a 
probation officer might play a similar role as an attorney might to an 
adult.89 The Court held: “[I]t cannot be said that the probation officer 
is able to offer the type of independent advice that an accused would 
expect from a lawyer retained or assigned to assist him during 
 
 80. Id. at 710. 
 81. Id. at 710–11. 
 82. Id. at 711. 
 83. Id. at 711–12. 
 84. Id. In making this argument, Fare relied on a previous California Supreme Court decision, 
People v. Burton, 491 P.2d 793 (1971), which held that a minor’s request made during custodial 
interrogation to see his parents constituted an invocation of the minor’s Fifth Amendment rights. 
Fare, 442 U.S. at 712. 
 85. Id. at 707. 
 86. Id. at 714–15. 
 87. Id. (“Here, however, we face conduct which, regardless of considerations of capacity, 
coercion or voluntariness, per se invokes the privilege against self-incrimination.”). 
 88. Id. at 707–08. 
 89. Id. at 722. 
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questioning.”90 Rather than consider the situation from the perspective 
of the child, the Court instead focused its analysis on what type of 
services Michael’s probation officer would be able to provide him.91 
The Supreme Court reiterated its stance on the totality test, 
insisting that “this totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate 
to determine whether there has been a waiver even where interrogation 
of juveniles is involved.”92 Fare remains the controlling case for 
Miranda waiver analysis regarding children. 
2.  The Totality Test in the Miranda Custody Analysis:  
J.D.B. v. North Carolina (2011) 
Three decades passed before the U.S. Supreme Court 
meaningfully revisited the question of whether it should institute any 
extra protection for children under Miranda—this time specifically 
under the Miranda custody analysis. Until mid-2011, courts applied 
the same Miranda custody analysis in cases where the defendant was 
a child as in cases where the defendant was an adult.93 Then, in J.D.B. 
v. North Carolina, the Court articulated how this part of the Miranda 
analysis should differ  when the defendant is under 18 years old.94 At 
the center of this “new” interpretation was the totality test. 
In J.D.B., a 13-year-old boy (“J.D.B.”) suspected of burglary 
challenged the Court to consider whether the age of a child subjected 
to police questioning is relevant to the Miranda custody analysis.95 In 
Justice Sotomayor’s majority opinion, the answer was a muddy “sort 
of.” The Court held that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda 
custody analysis, so long as the child’s age was known to the officer 
at the time of questioning, or would have been objectively apparent to 
a reasonable officer.96 The Court reasoned that: 
In some circumstances, a child’s age would have affected 
how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would 
perceive his or her freedom to leave. That is, a reasonable 
child subjected to police questioning will sometimes feel 
 
 90. Id. at 721. 
 91. Id. at 722–23. 
 92. Id. at 725. 
 93. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011). 
 94. Id. 
 95. Id. at 264–65. 
 96. Id. at 274. 
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pressured to submit when a reasonable adult would feel free 
to go.97 
The Court made clear, however, that this addition to the custody 
analysis was a subtle one: “We think it clear that courts can account 
for that reality without doing any damage to the objective nature of the 
custody analysis.”98 
J.D.B. thus took a major step toward protecting children’s Fifth 
Amendment rights by explicitly requiring courts to consider a child’s 
age where her age was reasonably apparent to the officer at the time 
she was questioned or would have been to a reasonable officer. It 
remains the leading case on applying custody analysis to children. 
Although distinctions exist between the custody and waiver 
analysis, both rely on the totality test to fairly protect defendants of all 
ages. Yet, this is unreasonable because the purported objective nature 
of the totality test is inherently at odds with the need to consider the 
uniquely vulnerable nature of children. While J.D.B. valiantly 
attempted to harmonize the two, In re Joseph H., decided four years 
later, clearly demonstrates why the issue cannot be resolved without a 
more radical solution. 
C.  Reaffirming the Totality Test Analysis in the  
Miranda Waiver Context: In re Joseph H. 
In 2015, the California Supreme Court again had the opportunity 
to address the special characteristics of children in a waiver context. 
In In re Joseph H., 10-year-old Joseph was questioned by police in the 
presence of his mother, but without the assistance of counsel.99 During 
his interrogation, he admitted to shooting his heavily abusive, neo-
Nazi father.100 Despite his objection to this evidence, the Superior 
Court of Riverside County found the confession admissible; Joseph H. 
was sentenced to serve 10 years in a California juvenile facility for 
second-degree murder—a sentence equal to Joseph’s entire life as of 
that time.101 
 
 97. Id. at 271–72. 
 98. Id. at 272. 
 99. In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 177–78 (Ct. App. 2015). 
 100. Id. at 178. 
 101. Kristine Phillips, ‘I Shot Dad’: The Tragic Case of a Child Who Killed His Abusive, Neo-
Nazi Father, WASH. POST (Aug. 26, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/post-
nation/wp/2016/08/26/i-shot-dad-the-tragic-case-of-a-child-who-killed-his-abusive-neo-nazi-
father/?utm_term=.70d63e887cbd. 
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The California Court of Appeal upheld Joseph’s conviction, 
applying the totality test outlined in Fare.102 It held that Joseph’s 
confession was admissible because “Joseph’s responses indicated he 
understood his Miranda rights and that he validly waived his rights 
despite his young age, his ADHD [attention deficit hyperactivity 
disorder], and below average intelligence.”103 It added that Joseph’s 
response to the question of whether he understood his right to remain 
silent did not sufficiently demonstrate that he did not knowingly and 
understandingly waive his rights.104 
After the California Supreme Court denied review, (in the face of 
a 3-justice dissent written by California Supreme Court Justice Liu), 
the U.S. Supreme Court declined to hear the case.105 
III.  THE COURTS’ CURRENT APPLICATION OF THE TOTALITY TEST 
FAILS TO ACCOUNT FOR CHILDREN’S UNIQUE VULNERABILITIES 
The totality test analysis, as described above, is incomplete 
because it lacks critical fail safes to ensure the protection of minors. 
The Court’s continued contention that, as applied, it always fully 
accounts for the distinctive characteristics of children as a subgroup is 
based on a theoretical analysis that borders on illusory. The actual 
results of the courts’ analyses in cases involving children have 
sometimes yielded absurd outcomes, revealing that children are 
indeed falling through the cracks. There is no better evidence for this 
than the stories of sixteen-year-old Michael, thirteen-year-old J.D.B., 
and of course, 10-year-old Joseph. 
A.  Fare v. Michael C.: A Lacking Analysis Under the Totality Test 
The Court’s totality test analysis is most flawed in its application 
of the waiver analysis to children. In Fare, the Court began by 
explaining why it maintained such confidence in the totality test’s 
ability to protect children: 
We discern no persuasive reasons why any other approach 
[than the totality test] is required where the question is 
whether a juvenile has waived [her] rights, as opposed to 
 
 102. Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 185. 
 103. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks 
omitted). 
 104. Id. 
 105. Id.; H v. California, SCOTUSBLOG, https://www.scotusblog.com/case-files/cases/h-v-
california/ (last visited Apr. 7, 2019). 
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whether an adult has done so. [This approach] permits—
indeed, it mandates—inquiry into all the circumstances 
surrounding the interrogation. This includes evaluation of the 
juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and 
intelligence, and into whether he has the capacity to 
understand the warnings given him, the nature of his Fifth 
Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those 
rights.106  
In addition to these considerations, the Court also cited the “special 
expertise” of juvenile courts as yet another reason why the totality test 
appropriately considers “those special concerns that are present when 
young persons, often with limited experience and education and with 
immature judgment, are involved.”107 
Yet, there is a clear disconnect between the theory outlined above 
and the actual application of the test. In Fare, the Court ultimately held 
that Michael had in fact properly waived his rights.108 In reaching this 
conclusion, the Court purported to consider the factors it had described 
earlier in its opinion: “age,” “experience,” “education,” “background,” 
“intelligence,” and “comprehension.”109 In weighing these factors, the 
Court found that the interrogating officers had taken care to “ensure 
[the child] understood his rights.”110 The Court specifically stated that 
there was “no indication [the child] was of insufficient intelligence to 
understand the rights he was waiving, or what the consequences of that 
waiver would be.”111 
Additionally, the Fare Court held that “no special factors 
indicate[d] that [the child] was unable to understand the nature of his 
actions.”112 To support this, the Court first pointed to Michael’s age 
(sixteen-and-a-half) and his “considerable experience with the 
police.”113 Next, in considering whether there was any “indication that 
[the child] was of sufficient intelligence to understand the rights he 
was waiving, or . . . the consequences of that waiver,” the Court 
 
 106. Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979) (emphasis added).  
 107. Id. 
 108. Id. at 726. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 726–27. 
 113. Id. at 726 (“[The child] had a record of several arrests. He had served time in a youth camp, 
and he had been on probation for several years. He was under the full-time supervision of probation 
authorities.”). 
RODRIGUEZ_V.8 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/19  8:37 PM 
664 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:647 
offered a thin analysis that was conclusory at best.114 It found no 
indication that Michael “was of insufficient intelligence to understand 
[his] rights.”115 Finally, in considering the behavior of the officers and 
the nature of the interrogation itself, the Court concluded that Michael 
“was not worn down by improper . . . tactics or lengthy questioning or 
by trickery or deceit.”116 
The analysis set out above is an excellent example of the issues 
that arise when the totality test is applied to children without some 
direct consideration of what it means to be a child. The Court gave 
only a cursory examination of certain critical factors benefitting 
Michael C., while inappropriately placing more weight on factors that 
benefit law enforcement. The Court also ignored other significant 
evidence altogether. For example, the Court gave great weight to the 
officers’ explanation of Miranda rights and held that from this 
explanation, Michael undoubtedly understood what he had been 
told.117 However, in reaching this conclusion, the Court was neither 
required nor encouraged to consider the remainder of the transcripts 
or the fact that sixteen-year-olds generally do not have exposure to the 
intricacies of the law. The Court seemed to refuse to consider the 
implications of being arrested at such a young age. In fact, the Court 
seemed to impose a higher expectation on Michael to understand his 
rights because of his previous history with law enforcement.118 The 
Court also failed to address how a sixteen-year-old might respond to 
police interrogation tactics as compared to an adult. Had the Court 
given proper weight to these other “circumstances,” this case would 
likely have resulted in a different outcome. 
Perhaps the most glaring issue with the Court’s application of the 
totality test is its failure to address a certain exchange between Michael 
and the officers altogether, which clearly indicated that Michael did 
not understand his right to legal counsel.119 That conversation between 
Michael and an officer appeared in the transcripts as follows: 
 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. 
 116. Id. at 726–27. 
 117. Id. at 726 (“The transcript of the interrogation reveals that the police officers conducting 
the interrogation took care to ensure that [the child] understood his rights. They fully explained to 
[the child] that he was being questioned . . . then informed him of all the rights delineated in 
Miranda, and ascertained that [he] understood.”). 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 710–11. 
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Q: Do you understand these rights as I have explained them 
to you? 
A: Yeah. 
Q. Okay, do you wish to give up your right to remain silent 
and talk to us about this murder? 
A: What murder? I don’t know about no murder. 
Q: I’ll explain to you which one it is if you want to talk to us 
about it. 
A: Yeah, I might talk to you. 
Q: Do you want to give up your right to have an attorney 
present here while we talk about it? 
A: Can I have my probation officer here? 
Q: Well I can’t get a hold of your probation officer right now. 
You have the right to an attorney. 
A: How I know you guys won’t pull no police officer in and 
tell me he’s an attorney?120 
There are several indicators here that demonstrate Michael had no idea 
what Miranda rights were or what they guaranteed. Again, however, 
in its analysis under the totality test, the Court strangely stated that 
there was “no indication in the record that [Michael] failed to 
understand what the officers told him.”121 The transcript of his 
interrogation, however, tells a different story. 
To begin, Michael failed to answer any of the questions regarding 
his rights decisively.122 Although a proper waiver does not require 
explicit language, the totality of the circumstances must still indicate 
that it was “knowing and voluntary” for it to be valid.123 Based on 
Michael’s responses, it is difficult to see how the Court believed he 
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. In fact, the most 
concerning portion of this transcript, in which Michael asks, “How I 
know you guys won’t pull no police officer in and tell me he’s an 
attorney?”, strongly indicates Michael’s limited understanding of his 
rights.124 He clearly believed that police investigators could 
 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. at 726. 
 122. Id. at 710–11. 
 123. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 
375–76 (1979). 
 124. Fare, 442 U.S. at 710–11. 
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impersonate an attorney, and did not comprehend that he held a 
Constitutional right to counsel. 
Further, it is obvious from this exchange that Michael wished for 
some form of assistance when he requested his probation officer.125 
While the Court made clear that this did not adequately trigger 
Michael’s Fifth Amendment rights, it was also not considered by the 
Court as one of the “circumstances” in this case.126 Other than to deny 
the California Supreme Court’s per se probation officer rule, the Court 
did not consider Michael’s request for a familiar face relevant here.127 
In addition to ignoring the above transcripts, the Court also 
generally seemed to dismiss the fact that Michael was only sixteen 
years old and had no basic understanding of criminal law. In Fare, 
Justice Powell argued in his dissent that the majority opinion should 
certainly have considered Michael’s age in its application of the 
totality test.128 He explained that, although Michael “had prior brushes 
with the law[,] . . . the taped interrogation—as well as his testimony at 
the suppression hearing—demonstrates that he was immature, 
emotional, and uneducated, and therefore was likely to be vulnerable 
to the skillful, two-on-one repetitive style of interrogation to which he 
was subjected.”129 Oddly, however, as mentioned above, the majority 
seemed to attach considerable weight to Michael’s history with law 
enforcement in its evaluation of his understanding of Miranda.130 
Seeming to imply a correlation between interactions with the police 
and an up-to-date knowledge of Constitutional rights, the Court 
unfairly penalized Michael for his past.131 
Finally, the Court rejected Michael’s argument that the police 
pressured him into cooperating and providing incriminating 
statements.132 In applying the totality test, the Court declared that “the 
officers did not intimidate or threaten [Michael] in any way. . . their 
questioning was restrained and free from abuses that so concerned the 
Court in Miranda.”133 The Court was unpersuaded by Michael’s 
 
 125. See id. 
 126. See generally Fare, 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. at 733 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 129. Id. 
 130. Id. at 726 (majority opinion). 
 131. Id. 
 132. Id. at 727. 
 133. Id. 
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arguments that the police had threatened him, ignored his pleas to stop 
talking, and continued after he expressed fear by starting to cry.134 
The Fare Court’s application of the totality test not only 
demonstrates how the test can fail to sufficiently consider those 
characteristics most crucial in a juvenile case, but even worse, it shows 
how easily subjectivity can saturate the current analysis to eliminate a 
meaningful consideration of age altogether. The same story was 
repeated in In Re Joseph H. 
B.  In re Joseph H.: A Continued Misapplication of the Totality Test 
The Joseph H. court held that, from “all the surrounding 
circumstances,” Joseph knowingly and voluntarily waived his 
Miranda rights.135 Yet, the California Court of Appeal’s analysis also 
applied the totality test in the same flawed manner.136 The courts again 
failed to give proper weight to the factor most significant to children 
as a class: age. As in Fare, the Joseph H. court ignored a troubling 
transcript of a conversation between the police and Joseph. It too 
stated that “the record does not support the minor’s assertion that 
[Joseph’s] hesitation, confusion and misunderstanding of the full 
scope of what it meant to ‘waive’ his rights, showed 
involuntariness.”137 This language is eerily reminiscent of the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s conclusion in Fare.138 
The transcript, which the California Court of Appeal omitted 
from its majority opinion, is telling of Joseph’s lack of understanding 
of his rights in the same way it was in Fare: 
Q: Okay. Now I’m going to read you something and it’s–it’s 
called your Miranda Rights. And, I know you don’t 
understand really what that is. But, that’s why your mom’s 
here. Okay? . . .  
A: Yeah. 
Q: All right. So, you have the right to remain silent. You 
know what that means? 
 
 134. Id. 
 135. In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 186–87 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
 136. Id. at 186 (“On appeal, the determination of a trial court as to the ultimate issue of the 
voluntariness of a confession is reviewed independently in light of the record in its entirety, 
including all the surrounding circumstances.”). 
 137. Id. at 187. 
 138. See Fare, 442 U.S. at 726 (“There is no indication in the record that [Michael] failed to 
understand what the officers told him [about his Miranda rights].”). 
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A: Yes, that means that I have the right to stay calm. 
Q: That means y-you do not have to talk to me. 
A: Right.139 
This response should have been an obvious signal that a knowing 
and voluntary waiver did not occur. As admitted by the officer herself, 
Joseph had no understanding of his Miranda rights.140 
The Joseph H. court also placed a significantly higher weight on 
factors benefitting law enforcement than on those favoring children. 
The Joseph H. court stated that it was not persuaded by Joseph’s 
“age,” “the fact that he suffers from ADHD,” and “other mental 
disabilities,” because “the detective repeatedly asked Joseph if he 
understood what she was explaining about his rights, and when he 
demonstrated misunderstanding, she provided additional 
explanation.”141 It stated that “Joseph’s responses indicated he 
understood,” and that “nothing in the record supports the premise that 
he was confused or suggestible.”142 
The Joseph H. court further explained why, under the totality test, 
Joseph’s actions constituted a legal waiver. It first pointed to the fact 
that Joseph had his stepmother “for support” in deciding whether to 
waive his rights by speaking with police.143 It then cited Joseph’s show 
of “guilt for what he had done” as a second reason why Joseph 
“decided” to waive his rights.144 
Given the unique facts of Joseph H., it is bizarre that the outcome 
and opinion in this case are nearly identical to those in Fare.145 These 
similarities raise serious doubts about the courts’ analysis under the 
totality test because it continually fails to give proper weight to a 
child’s age. Michael C. and Joseph H. demonstrate how an incomplete 
application of the totality test in the Miranda waiver analysis can 
seriously endanger the rights of children. While the totality test would 
be a useful strategy in situations where the childhood factor is 
 
 139. In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 3 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting). The transcript was cited by 
California Supreme Court Justice Liu in his dissenting opinion to the decision denying review of 
Joseph H.  
 140. Id. 
 141. In re Joseph H., 188 Cal. Rptr. 3d 171, 186 (Cal. Ct. App. 2015). 
 142. Id. 
 143. Surprisingly, the court did not consider this a conflict of interest, despite the fact that 
Joseph’s stepmother was newly widowed because Joseph had just shot and killed her husband. Id. 
 144. Id. at 187. 
 145. See Phillips, supra note 101. This same case produced headlines such as, “‘I Shot Dad’: 
The Tragic Case of a Child Who Killed His Abusive, Neo-Nazi Father.” Id.  
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appropriately accounted for, as it stands now, its inherent openness to 
subjective application makes it a poor tool for use in safeguarding 
children’s Miranda rights. The totality test requires that the courts 
consider all of the circumstances, but, as explained above, that is 
clearly not what is occurring when it is actually applied to minors. 
Thus, this test’s analysis requires more guidance and specificity when 
considering the actions of children. 
C.  J.D.B.: Improving the Totality Test Analysis by 
Directly Accounting for Age 
While J.D.B. is admittedly far more realistic about the differences 
between adults and children, it still does not fully accomplish the 
protections such a class deserves.146  
In the majority opinion written by Justice Sotomayor, the Court 
held that a child’s age properly informs the Miranda custody 
analysis.147 This is significant because prior to J.D.B., age was not 
explicitly considered under the totality test custody analysis.148 The 
majority opinion openly reflected on the Court’s duty to protect 
children because of their unique status.149 Further, it acknowledged the 
difficulties of applying the test to children without considering how 
they differ from adults. The Court candidly stated: “[T]he dissent 
insists that the clarity of the custody analysis will be destroyed unless 
a ‘one-size-fits-all reasonable-person test’ applies. In reality, however, 
ignoring a juvenile defendant’s age will often make the inquiry more 
artificial, and thus only add confusion.”150 The Court went on to 
explain the absurd and paradoxical implications of applying the 
totality test without taking age into consideration: 
[J.D.B.] is a prime example. Were the court precluded from 
taking J.D.B.’s youth into account, it would be forced to 
evaluate the circumstances present here through the eyes of 
a reasonable person of average years. In other words, how 
would a reasonable adult understand his situation, after being 
 
 146. See J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 277 (2011) (holding that age should be directly 
considered in the Miranda custody analysis, but only where the child’s age is known or reasonably 
apparent). 
 147. Id. at 265. 
 148. See id. at 278. 
 149. See generally id. at 272–80 (discussing the inherent vulnerabilities of children as 
compared to adults). 
 150. Id. at 279. 
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removed from a seventh-grade social studies class by a 
uniformed school resources officer . . . ?151 
Although the Court recognized the futility of applying the totality 
test to children without accounting for age, it did not go far enough. 
The Court reiterated that it now requires that age be considered under 
the totality test in a Miranda custody analysis; however, it did not 
entirely elaborate on how this solves the aforementioned tension.152 It 
simply stated that this new requirement did not create a further 
conflict.153 Thus, even J.D.B., with all its reflection on the 
fundamental differences between adults and children,154 did not 
wholly repair the subjective nature of the analysis. The Court qualified 
its holding by stating: “this is not to say that a child’s age will be a 
determinative, or even a significant, factor in every case.”155 
D.  Modern Studies of Juvenile Development Support Giving a 
Child’s Age More Weight Under the Totality Test 
As illustrated in the case law above, the totality test, as applied 
now, is failing to assign appropriate weight to a child-suspect’s age. 
Contemporary science supports the assertion that age should be a far 
more significant factor under the totality test. 
Today, the scientific community has supplied the legal 
community with a substantial amount of research showing that 
children’s brains are in a fundamentally different developmental stage 
than those of adults. This research demonstrates that the prefrontal 
cortex, a region of the brain just behind the forehead, controls 
judgment, problem-solving, decision-making, and the regulation of 
impulsive behavior.156 Research further shows that the prefrontal 
cortex does not fully develop in humans until the early twenties.157 
 
 151. Id. at 275–76. 
 152. Id. at 271–72. 
 153. Id. at 277 (“We hold that so long as the child’s age was known . . . or would have been 
objectively apparent . . . its inclusion in the custody analysis is consistent with the objective nature 
of that [totality] test.”). 
 154. See, e.g., id. at 281 (“To hold, as the State requests, that a child’s age is never relevant to 
whether a suspect has been taken into custody—and thus to ignore the very real differences between 
children and adults—would be to deny children the full scope of the procedural safeguards 
that Miranda guarantees to adults.”). 
 155. Id. at 277. 
 156. Megan Crane et al., The Truth About Juvenile False Confessions, AM. B. ASS’N: INSIGHTS 
ON L. AND SOC’Y (Winter 2016), http://www.americanbar.org/publications/insights_on_law_ 
andsociety/16/winter2016/JuvenileConfessions.html. 
 157. Id. 
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Critically, this timeline makes a juvenile’s capacities and behaviors 
inherently less developed than those of full-grown adults.158 Scientists 
have demonstrated that this difference disadvantages juveniles 
because it results in a propensity toward impulsivity, underdeveloped 
cognitive capacities critical for information processing, difficulty 
weighing options and making complex decisions, and a tendency to 
over-emphasize potential short-term gains over possible long-term 
consequences.159 Thus, science tells us, it is extremely unfair to ask 
children to make such paramount legal decisions because they are 
often unable to fully realize the consequences of their actions.160 
The scientific principles outlined above also shed light on why, 
ethically, children should not be penalized for making irrational 
decisions concerning Miranda waivers on their own. The 
developmental differences between children and adults underscore the 
common-sense concern that children are more susceptible to outside 
influences and peer pressure. This makes them far more likely to fold 
under the stresses of custodial interrogation, waive their rights, and 
provide potentially false confessions.161 It has also been shown that 
younger children under the age of thirteen are particularly at risk of 
not understanding their rights.162 
This high rate of waiver also suggests a high rate of false 
confessions among those under 18. While extremely difficult to 
quantify, studies have concluded that the rate of false confessions for 
children lies somewhere between fourteen and twenty-five percent.163 
The U.S. Supreme Court itself has cited a study of false confessions, 
which found that out of 125 proven false confessions, sixty-three 
 
 158. See Laurence Steinberg, Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 5 ANNUAL REV. 
CLINICAL PSYCHOL. 47, 53–59 (2009) (expanded discussion of the cognitive and psychosocial 
development of the adolescent brain). 
 159. Elizabeth Cauffman & Laurence Steinberg, Emerging Findings from Research on 
Adolescent Development and Juvenile Justice, 7 VICTIMS & OFFENDERS 428 (2012). 
 160. See, e.g., Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948) (referring to a child in the context of 
confessions as an “easy victim of the law”). 
 161. Crane et al., supra note 156. 
 162. Brief for Juvenile Law Center & The Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth as Amici 
Curiae Supporting Petitioner, In re Joseph H., 137 S. Ct. 34 (No. 15-1086) [hereinafter Brief for 
Juvenile Law Center] (citing Jodi L. Viljoen et al., Adjudicative Competence and Comprehension 
of Miranda Rights in Adolescent Defendants: A Comparison of Legal Standards, 25 BEHAV. SCI. 
& L. 1, 2, 9 (2007)).  
 163. Steven A. Drizin & Richard A. Leo, The Problem of False Confessions in the Post-DNA 
World, 82 N.C. L. REV. 891, 907 (2004). 
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percent were from individuals under the age of twenty-five and thirty-
five percent were from individuals under the age of 18.164 
Finally, children simply lack the basic education necessary to 
understand a Miranda warning. An examination of the traditional 
Miranda language makes clear that it is unreasonable to expect minors 
to comprehend the warning at a level necessary for an adequate 
waiver. A careful look at the standard language of the warning reveals 
a long, complex sentence structure that requires more advanced 
reading levels to comprehend fully: 
“I have the right to an attorney.” (4th grade; comprised of 
seven words.) 
“I have the right to the presence of a lawyer and to talk with 
a lawyer before and during any questioning.” (10th grade; 
comprised of 21 words.) 
“I have the right to hire an attorney and have her present 
prior to and during any interview and questioning by peace 
officers or attorneys representing the state. I may have 
reasonable time and opportunity to consult with my attorney 
if I desire.” (12th grade; comprised of 45 words.)165 
As most children do not turn 18 until they reach the twelfth grade 
and graduate high school, it follows that most children who encounter 
Miranda warnings have not yet even had the opportunity to learn the 
language skills necessary to comprehend the warning in its entirety. 
Presumably, educators do not expect students to read above their grade 
levels, so it is impractical to demand such performance in this context. 
Thus, the takeaway here is that critical legal decisions like 
waiving Miranda rights are simply not compatible with a child or 
adolescent’s capacity for decision-making, and forcing a child to do 
so is unfair at best and cruelly irresponsible at worst. 
 
 164. See Brief for Center on Wrongful Convictions of Youth et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Petitioner at 21, J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261 (2011) (No. 09-11121); see also Corley v. 
United States, 556 U.S. 303, 320–21 (2009) (“[C]ustodial police interrogation by its very nature, 
isolates and pressures the individual . . . and there is mounting empirical evidence that these 
pressures can induce a frighteningly high percentage of people to confess to crimes they never 
committed.”) (alteration in original) (citations omitted). 
 165. Eric Y. Drogin & Richard Rogers, Juveniles and Miranda: Current Research and the Need 
to Reform How Children Are Advised of Their Rights, CRIM. JUST., Winter 2015, at 14. 
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IV.  PROPOSAL: THE TOTALITY TEST SHOULD INCLUDE A 
 DIRECT “PRODUCT OF CHILDHOOD” INQUIRY FOR CASES 
CONCERNING CHILDREN 
Taking into consideration the above critique, children require 
further protection when it comes to preserving their Miranda rights. 
This could be accomplished in several ways. 
A.  A Legislative Solution: SB 1052 and SB 395 
An obvious source of action could be the California legislature. 
Where California and federal courts have failed to implement 
enduring and effective change, the California legislature should fill the 
void. However, the legislative process is imperfect, and is often 
susceptible to public pressure,166 bureaucratic pitfalls, tit-for-tat 
negotiation, and of course, the gubernatorial veto.167 
The state legislature has in fact already attempted to fully address 
the issue of Miranda rights for children. In response to Joseph H., 
California State Senators Ricardo Lara and Holly Mitchell proposed 
Senate Bill 1052 (“SB 1052”), a law intended to consider the newly 
discovered developmental and neurological science surrounding the 
capacity of those under 18.168 The Bill’s authors hoped to add three 
distinct provisions to section 625.6 of the Welfare and Institutions 
Code, with the primary effect of requiring that children under 18 
consult with an attorney before either waiving Miranda rights or being 
subjected to a custodial interrogation.169 However, the Bill was vetoed 
by Governor Brown in 2016.170 
The following year, a new version of the bill, Senate Bill 395 
(“SB 395”), was introduced in the California legislature.171 This 2.0 
version was ultimately passed and signed into law on October 14, 
 
 166. See, e.g., Simpson v. Mun. Court, 92 Cal. Rptr 417, 421 (Ct. App. 1971) (“[T]he judicial 
process repels the intervention of external opinion while the legislative process stands in need of 
it.”). 
 167. See generally Lifecycle of a Bill, FRIENDS COMMITTEE ON LEGIS. OF CAL., 
http://www.fclca.org/news-a-resources/lifecycle-of-a-bill.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2019). 
 168. S.B. 1052, 2015–2016 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2016). 
 169. Id. 
 170. The uncertainty of the full consequences of SB 1052 were cited as reasons by Governor 
Brown for his veto: “I am not prepared to put into law SB 1052’s categorical requirement that 
juveniles consult an attorney before waiving their Miranda rights. Frankly, we need a much fuller 
understanding of the ramifications of this measure.” See Bill Status: S.B. 1052 Custodial 
Interrogation, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient 
.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052. 
 171. S.B. 395, 2017–2018 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2017). 
RODRIGUEZ_V.8 (DO NOT DELETE) 5/15/19  8:37 PM 
674 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 51:647 
2017.172 Although it consists of almost precisely the same language as 
SB 1052, SB 395 contains one crucial distinction—it only protects 
those minors aged 15 or younger.173 While this lowered age is surely 
devastating for advocates of juvenile rights, a deconstruction of SB 
395’s individual provisions demonstrates that the bill will still provide 
major protections for younger children and possibly also provide the 
legislature with valuable insight for future policy. 
For example, subsection (a) of SB 395 reads: 
Prior to a custodial interrogation, and before the waiver of 
any Miranda rights, a youth 15 years of age or younger shall 
consult with legal counsel in person, by telephone, or by 
video conference. The consultation may not be waived.174  
Subsection (a) states that minors “shall consult with legal counsel” 
prior to interrogation or waiver.175 This use of “shall” clearly indicates 
that a legal consultation would be mandatory under this addition. The 
proposed language further supports this by including that 
“consultation may not be waived.”176 The effect of this provision is to 
protect children from any of the demonstrably coercive environments 
and tactics used by law enforcement. By not allowing anyone—
guardian, officer, or other—to influence the accused child into 
waiving her Miranda rights, SB 395 offers significantly more 
protection, and, for that matter, clarity, than the totality test currently 
laid out by the Court. 
Although subsection (a) ensures some form of general legal 
consultation for young children, its design is still a cause for some 
concern. First, the flexibility provided by allowing a consultation to 
take place by phone or video conference may come at a cost. Face-to-
face counsel has the best chance of ensuring that the attorney’s 
directives are adequately followed. It is foreseeable that technical 
difficulties or bad connections, rushed communications, or most 
simply, forgetful children, can counterbalance any productive work 
contributed by the attorney from afar. For example, one can conceive 
of a situation where, after speaking with an attorney, the child would 
 
 172. Id. 
 173. Id. 
 174. Id. (emphasis added).  
 175. Id.  
 176. Id. 
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walk back into the interrogation room and immediately forget his 
attorney’s advice in the presence of another more intimidating adult. 
Additionally, this provision raises a separate concern that the law 
could be used as an excuse to hold children more accountable because 
they will have already had an opportunity to consult with an attorney. 
While such a provision will likely lower rates of self-incriminating 
statements given by children in general due to adequate counsel, it is 
also foreseeable that courts might become more hesitant to exclude 
confessions made after this statutorily-mandated counsel visit occurs. 
Subsection (b) instructs courts on the consequences of failing to 
provide counsel prior to waiver or interrogation:  
(b) The court shall, in adjudicating the admissibility of 
statements of a youth 15 years of age or younger made during 
or after a custodial interrogation, consider the effect of 
failure to comply with subdivision (a).177  
The bill proposed that courts “shall. . . consider” the effect of a failure 
to comply with the legal consultation requirement (“representation 
rule”).178 It is unclear how such a vague enforcement clause will 
operate, and whether or not it will serve as a positive or a negative 
addition to the rules surrounding children and Miranda. Despite 
requiring that courts “consider” the effects of a failure to comply with 
the representation rule, such language is highly suggestive of a 
discretionary enforcement measure rather than a bright line rule 
excluding inappropriately conducted interviews and waivers. This 
language raises important questions about consistency and 
enforcement. In a sense, the “shall. . . consider” language essentially 
transforms the requirements of SB 395 into yet another iteration of the 
totality test analysis, as a court considering non-compliance with the 
statute is apparently free to disregard it if it so chooses (or, more 
precisely, if other circumstances are more persuasive). 
The interpretation of such broad language would directly 
influence the behavior of officers. If interpreted narrowly, subsection 
(b) could strictly enforce the representation rule while still allowing 
judges some flexibility in their decisions. Interpreting subsection (b) 
narrowly would be a best-case scenario, where courts would generally 
suppress statements made without legal consultation. This 
 
 177. Id. (emphasis added). 
 178. Id. 
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interpretation would incentivize investigators to abide by the 
representation rule. The opposite is true as well. If courts interpret the 
language broadly, and exercised their discretion often to admit 
inappropriately-collected statements, investigators would be less 
cautious and would treat the representation rule more like a 
technicality. In other words, depending on how the rule is enforced, 
investigators would be incentivized to follow it either loosely or 
diligently. 
Subsection (c) of SB 395 includes an exception arguably more 
troubling than the malleability of subsection (b):  
(c) This section does not apply . . . if both of the following 
criteria are met:  
(1) The officer who questioned the youth reasonably believed 
the information he or she sought was necessary to protect life 
or property from an imminent threat.  
(2) The officer’s questions were limited to those questions 
that were reasonably necessary to obtain that information.179 
Subsection (c) exempts police from following the representation rule 
in certain emergency situations, subject only to a limited restriction on 
the types of questions permitted.180 Much like subsection (b), the 
potential for abuse with a provision like this is high and dependent 
almost entirely on the courts’ interpretation and analysis. A rough 
analogy can be drawn to the court-created exceptions to the Fourth 
Amendment’s guarantees against unreasonable searches and seizures, 
which some have argued have swallowed the rule.181 
As promising as the original SB 1052 might have been, the 
reintroduction and lower age compromise of SB 395 is a testament to 
the potential pitfalls of a legislative solution. Part of this reality is that 
some are more concerned about impeding the investigations of law 
 
 179. Id. (emphasis added). Part (d) of the proposed addition to § 625.6 of the Welfare and 
Institutions Code omitted above stated, “This section does not require a probation officer to comply 
with subdivision (a) in the normal performance of his or her duties under Section 625, 627.5, or 
628.” 
 180. Id. 
 181. See Florida v. White, 526 U.S. 559, 569 (1999) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The Court does 
not expressly disavow the warrant presumption . . . but its decision suggests that the exceptions 
have all but swallowed the general rule.”); see also Kendra Hillman Chilcoat, The Automobile 
Exception Swallows the Rule: Florida v. White, 90 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 917, 950 (2000) 
(discussing the effects of Supreme Court precedent on the warrant requirement). 
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enforcement than abusing the constitutional rights of children.182 A 
true working legislative solution would thus have to be able to address 
these competing interests. 
B.  A Bold Judicial Solution: A Bright Line Age Rule 
The next obvious source for a solution is the California court 
system. One option for California courts is to implement a bright line 
rule for children in the Miranda context. As discussed above, this 
would not be the first time California attempted something of this 
nature. Fare revolved around the U.S. Supreme Court reversing the 
California Supreme Court’s creation of a per se rule regarding a child’s 
invocation of his right to an attorney.183 
Such a bright line rule might, for example, articulate an age limit 
on the ability to waive a Miranda warning in a “knowing, intelligent, 
and voluntary” manner.184 Imposing a per se rule of this kind would 
ensure that inappropriately induced confessions, and particularly false 
confessions, by children under a specific age would never appear 
before a jury. 
While this appears to be an attractive option, as with the 
legislative approach, the bright-line rule strategy is also accompanied 
by one major criticism. Namely, if the court were to delineate an age 
limit as described above, it would necessarily exclude a considerable 
fraction of children above that age from the additional layer of 
protection. This is not to say that the overall effect would not be 
positive, however. It would simply be that children over the age limit 
would remain subject to the same totality test as before, while 
bolstering existing protections for the youngest of an already 
vulnerable category. (As is also be the case under SB 395). A rule like 
 
 182. Governor Brown’s veto message regarding SB 1052 is informative: “Recent studies . . . 
argue that juveniles are more vulnerable than adults and easily succumb to police pressure to talk 
instead of remaining silent. Other studies show a much higher percentage of false confessions in 
the case of juveniles . . . On the other hand, in countless cases, police investigators solve very 
serious crimes through questioning and the resulting admissions or statements that follow. These 
competing realities raise difficult and troubling issues . . . .” Bill Status: S.B. 1052 Custodial 
Interrogation, CAL. LEGIS. INFO., https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billStatusClient 
.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052. 
 183. See generally Fare v. Michael C., 442 U.S. 707 (1979). 
 184. California Supreme Court Justice Liu indicated as much in his opinion dissenting in the 
court’s decision to decline to hear Joseph H., outlining the value of considering “whether there is 
an age below which the concept of a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver has no meaningful 
application . . . .” In re Joseph H., 367 P.3d 1, 4 (Cal. 2015) (Liu, J., dissenting). 
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this could, however, act as a strong first step toward establishing that 
children in general cannot truly comprehend Miranda rights. 
Despite the potential of a bright line age rule, the fate of the 
California Supreme Court’s per se rule in Fare is discouraging, and it 
is possible such an approach would have a difficult time surviving  the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  
The most effective strategy at their disposal would thus be for the 
California courts to draw from other areas of law that have already 
more readily embraced the science and psychology of child brain 
development to perfect the existing rule regarding children and their 
Miranda rights. 
C.  Another Judicial Solution: A “Product of Childhood” 
 Inquiry Under the Totality Test 
First, borrowing from the special education context, federal law 
requires that children not be held responsible when a disruption arises 
out of or results from a child’s disability.185 Under Title 20 of the U.S. 
Code, if a child with a disability violates a code of student conduct and 
a school attempts to discipline the child or change her education 
placement, a specialized procedure known as a “manifestation 
determination” is triggered.186 An inquiry is made into the source of 
the violation of school code, and if it is determined that the conduct 
resulting in the violation was “caused by, or had a direct and 
substantial relationship to, the child’s disability,” the school’s 
disciplinary measures are rescinded and a more specialized plan to 
address the behavior is implemented.187 
Similarly, the law has a history of providing comparable 
protections for adults with severe mental impairments, specifically in 
the context of criminal law. Consider the Durham rule, for example, 
which provides that “an accused [person] is not criminally responsible 
if his unlawful act was the product of mental disease or mental 
defect.”188 
 
 185. 20 U.S.C. § 1415(k)(1)(E)–(F) (2012). 
 186. Id. 
 187. Id. 
 188. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862, 874–75 (D.C. Cir. 1954) abrogated by United 
States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). While this rule is no longer widely used in the 
insanity context, its “product of” language would be useful in the Miranda context as applied to 
children. See United States v. Brawner, 471 F.2d 969 (D.C. Cir. 1972). 
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These examples demonstrate that the law already uses workable 
solutions that could satisfactorily account for the unique 
characteristics of children. While this is not to say that childhood 
should be considered akin to a disability, these other examples do 
demonstrate that legal models capable of considering the special 
nature of childhood already exist.  
This Article proposes that the courts adapt the totality test by 
assigning a stronger weight to a child’s age in the Miranda analysis. 
In considering the totality of the circumstances, a child’s age is an 
extremely significant circumstance. To hold otherwise yields the 
results explored earlier in this Article. Thus, under the umbrella of the 
totality test, the courts should craft a “product of childhood” inquiry 
which directly asks, “Does a child’s waiver or confession arise out of, 
or is it the product of, her childhood?” Such an addition would 
necessarily require a court to consider the realities of science and 
childhood psychology, and would provide children with the most 
comprehensive protection of their Miranda rights to date. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
As far as Miranda jurisprudence is concerned, it is time to finally 
address the significant vulnerabilities that accompany childhood. By 
paralleling the logic used to accommodate such vulnerabilities in other 
legal contexts, such recognition has the potential to provide children 
with the protections that both science and common sense recommend. 
Indeed, science supports this idea, as the physical differences between 
child and adult brains demonstrate the measurable developmental 
differences that have critical effects on a child’s ability to understand 
concepts like waiver of constitutional rights. 
While each of the avenues mentioned above has its respective 
strengths and weaknesses, the proposed “product of childhood” 
inquiry provides considerable benefits while minimizing possibilities 
for abuse and misapplication. It improves upon the already-existing 
totality test by centering the inquiry on a child’s capacities rather than 
the fictional reasonable person, while simultaneously moving the 
analysis away from considerations that disproportionately benefit law 
enforcement. Regardless of the solution, such problems will persist in 
California unless and until a more comprehensive solution protecting 
all children under the law is adopted. 
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